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Abstract
This paper examines what factors are associated with the 2015 pension reform of
Korean civil servant as social innovation. We explore what lessons we can learn from
the pension reform in terms of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) model. The
ACF model allows us to identify how the substantial reform is, relying on policy
knowledge and entrepreneurs, possible in terms of political and social consensus. It
also clearly demonstrates the possibility of systematic pension reform at an appropriate
level through social learning and policy learning. Through the ACF model, we review
how South Korea’s civil servant pension reform act occurred at the end of May 2015.
The temporal scope covers from 2009 latest reform, and the 2014’s President
administrative policy speech that had strongly been showed her will to reform the
pension issue to the end of May 2015 when the reform bill enacted. We investigate
each advocacy coalition in order to elucidate the actors that constitute the two
coalition groups and to scrutinize whether a policy broker had existed in the process.
We also attempt to find the relatively stable parameters and external events that
affected the reform and also the belief system that shared by two advocacy coalition
group. The result clearly shows that the two coalition groups shared their normative
beliefs ultimately, for example, the need to change the current civil servant’s pension
system, but, the gap in the numerical change in the policy core belief and secondary
belief between the two actors had seemed to be excessively large and uncompromising.
A policy broker who can coordinate the interests and interests of stakeholder groups
over the government pension reform proposal was desperately needed. Negotiation and
leadership of the policy entrepreneurs led to a settlement of the government pension
reform proposal at the end of May 2015. Their entrepreneurial activities led to an
appropriate level of social consensus on the sustainable reform of pension system
through policy knowledge and learning. Further research is required to explore how
models of socially innovative forms of governance are created in various pension reforms
across various countries. It is also required to examine how policy entrepreneurs use
policy knowledge and information for a successful institutional reform through social
innovation across various countries.
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Introduction
Knowledge and information are crucial to inducing a grand social consensus on how to
define complicated common issues and on how to design reforms to solve them. Know-
ledge provides policy direction and idea about how to identify and unravel various
common issues we face. Social and institutional innovation for global problems and
public policy concerns involves heterogeneous interests and competing solutions. It is
not easy to find a unified agreeable solution from various political stakeholders, espe-
cially not only because of lack of information and knowledge about the resolution but
also because of lack of experience to solve them. For instance, it is difficult to design
and implement optimal institutional reforms for the public pension, health insurance,
and environmental pollutions with social externalities and market failure because of
lack of social knowledge about the solution to the reform idea and process as well as a
strong political resistance to those reforms.
Various institutional reforms across countries can provide a promising opportunity to
learn how social innovation can contribute to reconstructing and harmonizing compet-
ing political interests embedded in policy reforms (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996, 2000;
Greener, 2002; Marier, 2009; Martin, 1995; Peck, 2011; Zahariadis & Allen, 1995;
Weible, 2007). For instance, the evolution and reform of public employee pension sys-
tems across countries' pension reform usually involve a very complicated political and
economic interests. Since the 1990s, most developed countries have experienced in-
creasing political and social pressures on the need to reform public pensions due to
aging and government fiscal deficits. The Korean government has also received increas-
ing political and social pressures on public pension reforms. The past major reforms of
civil servant pension in South Korea took place at 1995, 2000, 2009 and 2015. Com-
pared the three previous pension reforms, the 2015 pension reform has resulted in the
most cost-cutting policy alternatives through the participation of various stakeholders
and political and social consensus processes. The 2015 pension reform in South Korea
provides a meaningful social knowledge about how to induce institutional reform in-
volving complicated political interests.
In a real world, it is difficult to find optimal economic and social solution to compli-
cated political issues such as pension reform. There are very few institutional reforms
through political consensus and social innovation leading to sustainable pensions sys-
tem. Most pension reforms across various countries have demonstrated many failures.
Some reforms were successful but most of them were not. However, the 2015 pension
reform of Korean civil servant is a relatively rare case of successful institutional reform
as social innovation. This reform case provides a good insight of how social innovation
leads to successful institution reform. There are still few studies about how policy re-
forms can be explained as a framework of social innovation in terms of policy know-
ledge, learning, and entrepreneurs in the policy process.
It is surprising that the massive reform of civil servant pension which is hard to im-
agine in Europe has been achieved through political and social consensus in a short
period of time in South Korea. Until now, past reforms of civil servant pension have fo-
cused mainly on short-term effects and once the effects of the increase in contributions
have disappeared. However, this time, not only did it actually cut pension rates for the
first time, but it also freezes pensioners’ pensions for five years. In particular, the 5-year
freeze of pension is significant because the financial effect of pension reform has a
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positive impact over the long term. The government pension reform proposal has been
successfully made with partial sacrifice and concession by public officials.1
Park’s administration in South Korea is the first government who handled the issue
in a wholesale with support from the public. That is why the civil servant pension re-
form in 2015 shows the uniqueness along the other bills. International pension experts
highlight that the civil service pension reform in South Korea is successful and desir-
able in terms of the current reform process and content.2 This pension reform has been
regarded as a successful social contract from abroad. It is important to analyze the
policy-making process that happens less frequently in society. It is crucial to under-
stand the curiosity of the key policy actors and events for the future government plan
that might be repeated.
The composition of this paper is as follows. First, we want to analyze institutional re-
form such as public servant pension in social innovation and political negotiation
process. In particular, we would like to analyze policy processes such as pension reform
from the viewpoint of the role of policy negotiators, utilization of policy knowledge,
and the learning of civic society on institutional conflicts. Second, we will analyze the
reform process of public servant pension based on the model of policy advocacy. Spe-
cifically, we would like to focus on the role of policy knowledge and experts. Finally, we
emphasize that the solution of the conflicts surrounding the system reform can be ana-
lyzed from the viewpoint of policy knowledge and policy community as social
innovation.
Institutional reform theories: Social innovation and the ACF model
Innovation research has expanded its scope and applicability to various open innovation
areas including social business and industrial areas (Yun et al., 2016). Recent studies have
explored how social innovation can evolve from the medical sector (Roh & Kim, 2017)
and how to implement social innovation (Svirina et al., 2016). Institutional reform and
innovation may be significantly related to social business and social innovation. However,
little research has attempted to link institutional reform to social innovation in terms of
policy coalition framework such as policy entrepreneurs and policy information.
Current complicated society needs smart social innovation for public interest beyond
business innovation for profit (Ackerman & Alstott, 1999; Ayob et al., 2016). Promoting
common goods and community values involve sustainable institutional reform to coord-
inate competing interests from multiple stakeholders. Institutional reform is, however, in-
herently intertwined with intricate political interests (Christopoulos & Ingold, 2015;
Edmiston, 2016). A typical economic innovation that seeks to maximize utility or profits
can hardly lead to appropriate institutional reforms for community sustainability. Social
innovation would be essential to solving competing interests involved from various stake-
holders through political negotiation and social consensus (Mulgan, 2006). Social
innovation allows us to learn how to find cooperative negotiation process and how to
generate social knowledge through social interactions among various stakeholders
(Mulgan, 2005). Social innovation can provide a social agreement on how multiple
competing stakeholders come together to develop new practices that traditionally
would have emerged only from a bureaucratic, top-down process in various institu-
tional reforms (Mulgan et al., 2007; Murray et al., 2010). The promising solution of
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an increasingly unequal and social conflict tensions embedded into institutional ar-
rangements and social contract can be derived from social innovation.
Institutional reform as social innovation
This paper assumes that institutional reforms include policy reform as well as other in-
stitutional innovations from rules, norms, and social practices in public policy areas. In
this sense, social innovation can include various institutional reforms. Pension reform
can be regarded as an institutional reform to adjust and change various eligible rules
for pension management. In this paper, pension reform is regarded as policy reform in-
cluding restructuring and transformation of various rules in pension system. Social
innovation in public policy comes from an effective response to the conflict that pits
the policy entrepreneur against a hostile political milieu. Social innovation should be
viewed in terms of achieving political consensus, even if incomplete reforms are sought
rather than in radical changes in pension reform. Further, it is a social innovation for
conflict resolution that created social expectation and demand to experience policy
learning and future consensus.
Social innovation comes from social experimentation and reshapes power relationships
(Manzini, 2014; Mulgan et al., 2007; Nicholls et al., 2015). Social innovation involves
social experiences to search for new solutions to unsolved social problems (Cajaiba-
Santana, 2014; Mulgan, 2006). Social innovation seeks to understand the heteroge-
neous innovation processes that bring about civil-society-based social changes. Social
innovation is politically constructed product of a need or a quest for solutions to vari-
ous community problems. The first process of institutional reform as social
innovation is to diffuse and attain recognition of the legitimacy of an innovative pro-
ject in various policy reforms. The next process is that policy entrepreneurs are to
play a positive or negative mediating role to clear up political barriers, to apply di-
verse information and knowledge embedded into competing interests and conflicts,
and to craft and build political consensus.
There have been various types of research on social innovation. However, they have
provided an anecdotal evidence and case studies. The topics about social innovation re-
search cover various areas from community innovation, urban development, and social
entrepreneurship. This paper focuses on how social innovation can be contributed to
explaining the creating of a greater public interest and the common good in policy
reforms.
Policy ideas presented by policy experts have created the basic environment for
consensus. In the future, we have created social expectations that policy knowledge
and experts can play a greater role in addressing conflicts and suggesting solutions.
ACF model: Information, beliefs and policy learning
Advocacy coalition framework(ACF) describe this political and social process as social
innovation to policy transformation for sustainable pension system. ACF and social
innovation provide a theoretical framework of the pension reform as political process
and social innovation. Relevant stakeholders and political coalitions are involved in
the reform process to induce political consensus with common beliefs and agreement.
The ACF model describes a useful conceptual framework that explains the stability and
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change of public policies involving various institutional reforms (Jenkins-Smith et al., 1991;
Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1994; Weible, 2007; Weible et al., 2009). It mainly focuses on the
coalitions that share normative beliefs and sometimes behave harmoniously. The coalition
groups comprehend changes in policy as the results of competition between coalition
groups to bring their concepts and beliefs into formal actions. The ACF model is based on
the four basic premises.
First, Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier (1994) claimed that time period of a decade or more
should be needed to comprehend the changes in policy process and the role of under-
standing therein. The concentration on a time period of 10 years or more is originated
directly from the findings about the understanding the functions of political studies. An
inevitable result is that it is the accumulated effect of findings from different researches
and also daily-life-knowledge that has powerful influence on policy (Jenkins-Smith &
Sabatier, 1994).3 Second, to understand the policy change over such a time span, Saba-
tier mentioned that the focus should be onto the policy subsystem’s action (1994).4
Some scholars argue that, in nowadays society, the most useful analysis unit for learn-
ing policy change is not a specific governmental research center. Rather, policy subsys-
tem actors from various places such like both public and private association who are
actively worried about policy problems or current matters are more useful unit to
understand the policy change. Third, Sabatier claimed that at least for domestic policy,
intergovernmental dimension must be contained inside the subsystems (Jenkins-Smith
et al., 1991; Weible, 2007; Weible et al., 2009). This is that policy subsystems, most of
the time, include actors from all levels of government. To examine policy change only
at the national level will, in most instances, be seriously misleading (Mazmanian &
Sabatier, 1989). Lastly, public policies or schemes should be conceptualized as belief
systems without a change. The belief system includes such sets of value priorities and
certain presumptions about how to achieve them in reality.
Figure 1 summarizes all these four perspectives from ACF. This figure shows three
main components of ACF including stable parameters, external events, policy sub systems
including coalition group and policy broker. Sabatier explained in his ACF theory that the
concept of relatively stable parameters includes the basic values from socio-culture,
Fig. 1 Advocacy coalition framework flow diagram (Source: The ACF flow diagram (2007 version) Weible
et al. 2009: 123)
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natural resources of political system and constitutional structure (2006). The ACF also
provides the critical prerequisite to the major change in political field including major
socio-economic alternations(e.g., economic stagnant or the rise of social campaigns),
changes in public attitudes, changes in political coalitions including ‘crucial’ and
‘presidential elections’; and policy decisions and influences from other subsystems
(Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1994).
The ACF model provides key concepts to explain policy changes like policy reform as
social innovation. The first component is the belief systems of each advocacy coalition
(Peffley & Hurwitz, 1985). Policy core beliefs which symbolize each coalition are causal
understandings and basic normative obligations across a whole policy domain or
subsystem at the next level. The ACF assumes that policy core beliefs can be de-
scribed as a fundamental “glue” of coalitions since they stand for basic understand-
ings and practical commitments within the specialized domain of policy brokers or
elites. Another belief is a tool for a coalition’s belief system to achieve its goals. This
belief scheme involves policy priorities regarding worthwhile rules from law or finan-
cial allocations, the designs of specific association, and the assessments from a var-
iety of actors’ performance. These beliefs are presumed to be more easily adjusted in
light of experience, new data or changing strategic analysis and reviews, which may
result in institutional reforms to induce social innovation.
The second one is policy coalition to choose one or more policies and strategies that
entail the use of ‘guidance instruments’. These are, for example, changes in rules, financial
reasons, private, or information. Each Coalition considers it as a means of modifying the
behavior of various governmental organizations in an effort to become aware of its policy
objectives. Normally, conflicting policies and strategies from a variety of coalitions are in-
terceded by a third group of actors, ‘policy brokers’ as in ACF, whose principal concern is
to figure out some reasonable settlements that will decrease and lower the intensity of
conflict. The conclusion can be one or more governmental bills or programs, which
finally will produce policy outputs at the operational level for like organization permit
decisions. These outputs can cause various impacts on targeted matter’s parameters
(e.g. entitlements or contribution rate), as well as side effects. On the basis of ad-
equate understandings of governmental decisions and the resultant influences, as well
as new data and opinions arising from search processes and external dynamics, each
advocacy coalition may alter its beliefs, which are generally in the secondary belief,
and its political strategies. The latter may involve the seeking of major agency revi-
sions at the collective choice level, more minor corrections at the operational level, or
even going outside the subsystem by seeking changes in the dominant coalition at the
systemic level (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier 1994).
The third one is policy learning to bring on social innovation. Within the overall
process of policy change, the advocacy coalition framework has a peculiar interest in
policy-oriented learning. Policy-oriented learning refers to behavioral intentions or to
relatively enduring alterations of thought. The alternations will result from experience
or the new information which are concerned with the modifications or attainment of
policy objectives. Policy-oriented learning includes (1) increased information of prob-
lem parameters and the factors that affect them, (2) the inside feedback loops described
in Fig. 2 regarding policy effectiveness, (3) perceptions concerning external dynamics,
and (4) changing understandings and awareness of the probable impacts of other
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substitute policies. The advocacy coalition framework presumes that such learning is a
tool that members of a variety of coalitions attempt to understand the world better in
order to further their policy objectives. Given that conceptual filtering is a fundamental
element of the ACF’s model. The individual members from coalition will defy informa-
tion suggesting their deep core belief or policy core beliefs may be invalid or unattain-
able and usually will use formal policy analyses to elaborate and support those beliefs
or attack their opponents’ opinions.
Advocacy coalition framework (ACF) as social learning and social innovation
Analytical framework
We apply various policy theories and concepts to explain how to reach the Korean Civil
Servant’s Pension Reform. Figure 2 shows how policy entrepreneurs and brokers pro-
vide policy knowledge and information and then how pension reform plans developed
by policy ideas induce political and social consensus as well as policy consensus for the
pension reform. All these reform processes involve policy learning as social
innovation. More specifically, we use the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) to ex-
plain a mechanism to describe the 2015 pension reform process (Jenkins-Smith & Saba-
tier, 1994; Weible, 2007). The ACF brings an opportunity to analyze how policy
entrepreneurs provide competing solutions and ideas and develop common beliefs
through learning process among different advocacy coalitions involved in the pension re-
form (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1989). Another advantage of ACF model allows us to ex-
plore how to develop a political, social, and policy consensus regarding the 2015 South
Korea’s civil servant pension reform act (See Fig. 2).
Fig. 2 Graphing the whole process of pension reform as advocacy coalition frame and social innovation
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By using the ACF model, the study will locate the two coalition groups that relates to
the pension reform of civil servant in South Korea, understands the relative stable par-
ameter, external events and every detail that made effect on the Korean policy subsys-
tem, and analyze the policy contents, actors and process of the Korean civil servant
pension reform that enacted in 2015. In order to do so, the temporal scope of study will
cover from the latest reform enacted in 2009 to the end of May 2015 when the new re-
form bill enacted. First, the study will examine and explain the basic concept of advocacy
coalition framework (ACF) and by making use of ACF model; the study will scrutinize the
policy-making process of the 2015 pension reform of Korean civil servant.
Analysis of the pension reform of Korean civil servants
Historical overview
President Park Geun-Hye emphasized political parties to support the government’s ef-
fort in civil servant pension reform. President Park mentioned that “Our future and
that of our descendants depend on the ongoing economic reform and national
innovation plans” (Bae, 2016) in the New Year’s meeting with key executives including
the prime minister and head officers from the Saenuri Party which is the major party in
South Korea currently. It was unusual for the president to mention the need of reform
bill which had been ongoing during New Year’s speech. The meeting and speech
strongly showed her willingness to reform the civil servant’s pension. After the speech,
the right-wing party and the experts who intensively claimed about the need of reform
had become powerful and carried more weights on their arguments.
On the other hand, amidst a sharp division between the right and left party, the Union
strongly expressed their chagrin towards its government about their concerns. According
to the interview from chairperson of Korean Government Employees’ Union, he men-
tioned that the need of change is well conceded inside the union society; however, it needs
sufficient time and right organization from social agreement to check thoroughly. He
even said that the urgent and clement issue does not mean, “Handle it quickly” (Kim,
2014). Not only from the inside voice, moreover, some scholars were also concerned
about the speedy process of the civil servant pension reform due to the president’s atten-
tion. Kim Jin-Soo, who is an expert in social welfare and professor in Yonsei University,
argued that the most important issue in pension reform is the fairness and equity. But, in
recent alternative plans, there were no fairness and equity by just cutting the figures and
numbers in the book. If the current alternative plan enforces, the plan might threat to the
lower level of civil servant’s livelihood. Therefore, the country needs sufficient time to im-
prove the structure system completely (Kim, 2014).
Continuing on conflicts between Union and the major party or between scholars,
both political parties (e.g., Saenuri and Saechunnyun Parties) rapidly postponed the on-
going extra congress meeting session. It was originally decided for closure on end of
May 2015, but delayed by one more day as their debates dragged on. The congress
meeting ended months of bipartisan battling over the pension reform. President Park
had repeated and pushed on requests for the lines, contents, and compromises of the
reform bill aimed for reducing the growing deficits in the civil servant pension fund as
in a bid for invigorating the current economic situation. The pension reform bill passed
the National Assembly by 233–0 (agree-disagree) with 13 abstentions. After the major
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party (Conservative) and Saechunnyun Party (Progressive) reached a last-minute settle-
ment, the bill that went on the theme of “Pay more, Receive Less” passed through the
National Assembly (Jeong, 2015).
Before looking into the reason why the civil servant pension had been reformed, one
should understand about the history of civil servant pension in South Korea. In the year
of 1992, it was the start of a civilian government in South Korea. Before 1992, there
were two military coup-de-tats in South Korea and afterward, it had been the military
regime for twenty years in South Korea before 1992. So, in the era of the military gov-
ernment, it was hard for the civil servants to claim and argue on their needs and wel-
fare. Since the basic role and concept of civil servants is to help the citizens and puts
the citizens on the top priority, complaining and arguing toward military government,
which had strong tendency of centralized government, on their rights was something
hard to be realized. Even though the International Labor Organization (ILO) kept
warned about the situation in South Korea, the military government had political ap-
athy on the problem. After the civilian government established in 1992, the government
finally accept the needs of the union. Basically, the history of South Korea’s union of
civil servants has been short and the background is unique compared with other coun-
tries. From since, in 1998, the officials organized the conference and then continued on
appealing their needs of the union to administration during 2004. Then finally, in 2006,
with the options of right to organize, right to bargain collectively, but no right to act
collectively, they earned the right to make the labor union. The union protected their
pension well and the government did not much care about it. However, the government
did not forecast the growing financial burden due to the fast-aging population in South
Korea. The Ministry of Health and Welfare now predicts that Korean would need to
pay an average of 18% of their earnings on public pension and civil servant pension to
fill up a 50% income replacement rate. However, 9% of incomes have gone to the public
pension and civil servant pension currently (Moon, 2015). Cheong Wa Dae (The Blue-
house) also worried about the problem and publically announced during the New-Year
speech. That was why the citizen and the government paid attention to the civil servant
pension reform, even though it had not been on the hot seat before the mere modifica-
tion happened in 2009.
The pension which was enacted for equality brought the inequality towards normal
people. A large amount of tax made the indigestible burden for both government and
every citizen. The government gave a warning that unless alternation was followed,
starting from 2016; the government should have to use 10 billion won in taxpayer’s
pocket every day to fill up for the financial deficit from the civil servant pension. The
atmosphere of needs of change in civil servant’s pension emerged not only from the
major party (Saenuri), but also from the minor party (Saechunnyun) too. Both parties
agreed on changing the segments of the civil servant’s pension. However, the exact fig-
ures and details for reform bill were the conflicts that dragged the time for two major
parties.
Finally, the National Assembly in May 2015 passed the civil servant pension reform
bill with the heavy agonizing ordeal from the strength of party conflict(See Table 1 and
Table 2). The reform increased the contribution rate of civil servant pension from 7%
to 9% in the next five years, while decreasing the entitlements from 1.9% to 1.7% in
phases over 20 years. It also postponed the first payment of civil servant pension by
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delaying the retirement age from 60 to 65 years old. Policy report suggests that the big
changes to the civil servant pension would cut back the government financial burden
about 333 trillion won over the next 70 years.
The background of the 2015 civil service pension reform
Until the final pension reform came out, there were important political events. The
main Major policy scenes and progress are as follows (See Table 3). On February 14th,
2014, President Park expressed a strong intention for the Civil Service Pension reform.
In early 2014, the government commissioned a research institute, Korea Development
Institute (KDI), to draft reform proposals and the institute presented its proposals to
the government in mid 2014. On October 28th, 2014, the ruling party Saenuri Party
(SP) submitted a reform bill in the name of all members. However, civil service unions
and the main opposition New Politics Alliance for Democracy (NPAD) strongly opposed
the reform bill. In December 29th, 2014, in order to seek a social consensus on the pen-
sion reform, the National Assembly set up Special National Assembly Committee and
Grand Compromise Committee which comprised rival parties’ congressmen, government
officials, civil service unions and experts. After having five dozen of conferences over
6 months, in the late May 2015, a grand consensus on the pension reform was reached.
On May 29th, 2014, the final reform bill was submitted to the National Assembly and the
Table 1 Past reforms of the Korean civil service pension system
Features
1995 Reform - Increasing contribution rates (3.6% → 4.9%)
- Introducing the retirement age (age of 60 only to the newly hired)
2000 Reform - Increasing contribution rate (4.9% → 5.5%)
- Raising the retirement age of the hired before 1996 incrementally (will be set 50 at
2001 and raised 60 until 2021)
- Expending period of pension calculation (final wage → final 3 years’ average wage)
2009 Reform - Increasing contribution rates (5.5% → 7%)
- Accrual rates (2.1% → 1.9%)
- Raising the retirement age (65 only to the newly hired)
2015 Reform - Increasing contribution rates (7% → 9%)
- Accrual rates (1.9% → 1.7%)
- Raising the retirement age (65 to all current employees with 11 years’ transition)
(60 only to the newly hired)
- Ceiling of contribution and benefits(1.8 times of average wage for all
members → 1.6 times)
- Maximum years of contribution(33 years → 36 years)
- Pension freezing (5 years from 2016 to 2020)
Source: Ministry of Personnel Management (2015)
Table 2 Comparison between before and after the 2015 pension reform of civil servant
Before the reform After the reform
- Full suspension When re-hired when re-hired, or when employed under
public corporate, or when extended to
elective civil servants
- Partial suspension (Reference) Average salary (3380 thousand
won)
Average pension (2240 thousand won)
- Coverage Real estate income excluded Real estate income included
- Indexation CPI CPI after 5 years’ pension freezing
Source: Ministry of Personnel Management (2015)
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bill passed 233–0 with 13 abstentions. On June 22th, 2015, the government made the law
public and the law will be implemented from January 1st, 2016. In overall, both of the
government and the National Assembly and opened a way to resolve various reform prob-
lems through social compromise and consensus.
Through these institutional processes, the government and the ruling party sought to
establish consensus through several rounds of talks with civil service organizations. In
December 2014, the ruling party and the opposition party launched a ‘Grand Consen-
sus Summit(GSC)’ to discuss public employee pension reform proposals. The oppos-
ition party members, opposition lawmakers, experts, government representatives, civic
groups, and public service organizations participated in the GCS. This institutional
mechanism has led to a consensus on the reform schemes of income redistribution and
the efficiency of pension financing, which had not been tried in the past to reform civil
servant pensions.
The 2015 South Korea civil servant pension reform is the case of confrontation between
the ‘structure reform coalition group (the Government and the Saenuri party)’ that shares
the same belief system of improving the current civil servant pension system into
complete structure change and the ‘parametric-reform coalition group (the opposition
party, Federation of Government Employee Union, The Korean Government Employees’
Union)’ that shares the belief system of adhering the current situation or at least adjusting
the figures. Using the advocacy coalition framework, the study will analyze the policy-
making process of civil servant pension in South Korea that happened in 2015.
To use ACF model, the civil servant pension reform has to meet four premises.
First, the time period of 10 years or more should be needed to comprehend the
changes in policy process. Before looking into the first premise, in the United States,
the presidency acknowledges the reappointment, therefore, the process of policy change
can prolong over decade or more. However, the presidency in South Korea does not
accept the reappointment, therefore, the first premise of ACF does not fit the certain
case in South Korea. Thus, to adjust the theory to the situation in South Korea, the
Table 3 Key policy events and aspects in the 2015 pension reform
Date Events
February 25th, 2014 - President Park expressed a strong intension for the Civil Service Pension reform
in her annual announcement
January~June, 2014 - Korea Development Institute (KDI) carried out a reform project
October 17th, 2014 - The government (the Ministry of Personnel Management) announced her
reform proposal
October 28th, 2014 - The ruling Saenuri Party(SP) submitted a Civil Service Pension reform bill
December 29th, 2014 - The National Assembly set up the Special Committee and the Grand Compromise
Committee
January~May, 2014 - The Special Committee in the National Assembly, coupled with the Grand
Compromise Committee, launched reform discussion
- About 59 times of committee conferences and public hearings (90 times when
unofficial meetings are included)
May 2nd, 2015 - The National Assembly agreed on the reform bill in a wider context
May 29th, 2015 - The National Assembly passed the Civil Service Pension Reform bill
June 22th, 2015 - The Korean government made the law public
January 1st, 2016 - The Reform bill will be implemented.
Source: Ministry of Personnel Management (2015)
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process of policy change requires a time perspective of five years or more. It had been
20 years after the first amendment of civil servant pension was made (See Table 4). All
the four amendments were adjusted to increase the contribution rate and to diminish
the entitlements. The table below is the changes in contribution rate and entitlement
figures of civil servant pension during the last 20 years.
Second and third, to understand the policy change over such a time span, ACF pre-
sumed that the focus should be onto the policy subsystem’s action. For example, inside
the policy subsystems, there are interactions between actors from various institutions
and coalitions that try to seek, follow or influence the governmental decisions in a pol-
itical field. Also, subsystems should contain an intergovernmental dimension, at least
for domestic policy. There had been many changes in Korean political parties and
presidency. The interaction of actors and governmental decision were changed in many
ways during the time especially between the Second Amendment (The major party was
considerably progressive than the opposite party) and Third Amendment (The major
part was considerably conservative than the opposite party). Also, the two formal presi-
dents during the second and before third were elected from the progressive party. The
fourth amendment has its uniqueness in the interaction of actors because the current
administration is the first government that re-elected from the conservative party.
Fourth, public policies or schemes should be conceptualized as belief systems without
a change. The importance of the fourth premise that public policies and programs are
blended theories about how to achieve their objectives. Each coalition that aggregated
due to the civil servant pension reform had conceptualized their belief system into pol-
icy plans and carried through over time.
External events in civil servant pension reform
The attitude change in public & major socio-economic changes
The global financial crisis of 2007 to 2009 was the most serious meltdown to shake the
global economies in more than 70 years. As it emerged and got into a shape, it con-
founded governments, financial institutions, markets and industries, academics, media
commentators and finally the attitudes of the public. In a matter of months and years,
the speed of the crisis and its unexpected twists and turns excited fears around the
world. The crisis swept around the globe, impacting on financial markets, economies
and inevitably government budgets like tax problems. The crisis changed taxpayers’ at-
titudes towards civil servants and its pension. In South Korea, there is even nickname
for civil servants – “The Thick Iron Rice-Cooker”, which means they secured their job
and livelihood for good. The public acknowledged that the current law for civil servant
pension act is compensation for their generally low salaries. However, the statement
Table 4 The history of civil servant pension in South Korea
Time Content Contribution Rate Entitlements
1982 Civil Servant’s Pension Act 3.6% 2.1%
1995 First Amendment 4.9% 2.1%
2000 Second Amendment 5.5% 2.1%
2009 Third Amendment 7.0% 1.9%
2015 Fourth Amendment 9.0% 1.7%
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also seems to be outdated for the public opinion, given that civil servant’s paychecks fall
short of those among large companies, but are above the average in the private sector
like small and medium-sized enterprises.
According to a Gallup poll conducted from April 28 to 30 in the year of 2015, involv-
ing 1005 adults who can vote, 57% of respondents said they approved the revision of
the act, while 25% opposed the revision, well within the margin of error of plus or
minus 3.1 percentage points (2015). Gallup analyzed that, “the younger generation
showed the hostility and antagonism toward current act since the generation has a lot
of job applicants relatively”. Also, in the Gallup poll, the question asking, “When is the
right moment for the passing the bill?” 60% of people responded, “As soon as possible”
(Gallup Korea Daily Opinion, 2015).
Changes in the systemic governing coalition
The government and Congress in South Korea had delayed addressing the issue of
pensions for civil servants, despite being aware of decades that the 2009’s civil ser-
vant pension plan is not affordable. However, there had been changes in the political
history of modern Korea. After the 2009 presidential election, it marked a structural
shift in the political history of modern Korea, indicating the triumphant ascension of
the conservatives after ten years of exile. The former President Lee Myung-Bak and
his government stepped in and tried to amend the civil servant pension. He
strengthened the basis for the reform bill in 2009 however it was evaluated as mere
revolution since there was no help from the public or congress and administration
itself put less priority onto the problem. After his period had ended, another victory
went to the conservative party again in the 2013 presidential election. The current
President Park Geun-Hye administration had spurred and accelerated to reform the
civil servant pension. President Park Geun-hye called for efforts to ensure a bill
meant to reform the pension system for civil servants will pass the parliament by the
end of 2014. President Park addressed that, "We will pass onto our future genera-
tions a big burden that will not be bearable and deal a devastating blow to the state
finances ... if the reform is delayed again," in a Cabinet meeting (“Park Calls…” 2014).
President Park made the case for civil servant pension reform, addressing it would
be a difficult and painful process but would only get worse if postponed further. In
the year of 2015, the presidential office urged for the swift passage of a controversial
bill to reform the civil servant pension system as the National Assembly is slated to
open an extra session within the first quarter of 2015. The bill to re-structure the
debt-ridden civil servant pension plan had been the top priority of the Park Geun-hye
government in 2015.
Policy subsystem – coalition group in civil servant pension reform
Advocacy coalition group
Under the circumstance that was affected by various external effects, there were a
series of subsystem actors who had constructed the coalition groups for civil servant
pension reform – ‘structure reform’ or ‘parametric reform’. Before the reform in 2015,
only rare amounts of scholars and politicians were taking the civil servants pension ser-
iously. Since the civil servants played and still play important role in the election, it was
not easy and comfortable for politicians to take up a scalpel to perform the operation
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which might lead to losing the supporters and votes. However, after suffering from the
stagnant economy, the government financial deficit stood out conspicuously. The tax
began to be the burden for the public and the civil servant pension which was paid by
tax developed into the pain in the neck. This lead the candidate from the conservative
party won the presidential election both in 2009 and 2013. Also, many of scholars had
continued to warn the urgent situation about the civil servant pension and the public’s
attention started to focus on the matter of civil servant pension.
The civil servant pension reform was the process of the conflicts and the compro-
mises between two advocacy coalition groups – one who wanted a rapid structural
change of the civil servant pension and the other who did not agree on the rapid
change. It is true that the left-wing party agreed on reforming the civil servant pension.
However, both the left-wing party and the Korean Government Employees’ Union were
not satisfied with the radical change that did not think much for the civil servants, but
only wants unconditional consent from the left-wing party and the Union. From their
belief system, the advocacy coalition group had been formed. In the ‘structure reform
coalition group’, there were the Korean government (Ministry of Personnel Manage-
ment) and the Major Party (Saenuri Party). On the other sides, the ‘parametric reform
coalition group’ had been established. In the group, there were the Opposition Party
(Saechunnyun Party), Korean Government Employees’ Union, and Federation of Gov-
ernment Employee Unions (Fig. 3).
The belief system
Based on their belief system, both advocacy coalition groups struggle to fulfill their
goals to be made into a policy. Each actor shares their belief system and unites into an
advocacy coalition group. The belief system is the key principle that connects and
bonds the advocacy coalition group and the group shares the same belief systems
(Haas, 1990; Weible et al., 2009). In the belief system, the hierarchy structure – deep
core belief, policy core belief, and secondary belief - were formed inside. Policy know-
ledge becomes power and distinguishes the positions of different political groups em-
bedded into policy reform process (Haas, 1990).
In the case of the deep core belief, both advocacy coalition groups (‘structure reform
coalition group’ and ‘parametric reform coalition group’) acknowledged the characteris-
tic of basic problems in the civil servant pension. The increase of pension receiver
brought the government financial deficit in pension and comparing with the public




- Ministry of Personnel 
Management (Government)
- Saenuri Party (Ruling Party)
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- Saechunnyun Party 
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- Korean Government 
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Fig. 3 Two different advocacy coalition groups for pension reform
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However, in the case of the policy core belief, the two sides showed a different point
of stances. The government and the right-wing party wanted the civil servant pension
to be changed into complete structure reform. The ‘structure reform coalition group’
assumed that even though the 2009 civil servant pension reform had been made, they
thought that the 2009 reform still cannot meet the demand of the future budget.
Therefore, the group brought out the idea that not only adjusting the figures, but they
wanted the complete structural change in the pension bill. The group claimed that the
current tenure civil servants should do, ‘pay more and receive less in the future’, and
the pension for the newly designated civil servants should be included to the public
pension same with all the other citizens. On the other hand, the left-wing party, Feder-
ation of Government Employee Unions, and Korean Government Employees’ Union
could not agree on these changes. Especially, Korean Government Employees’ Union,
which is the organization that exists outside the law boundary but still powerful in the
field, did not want to change or reform the bill at all. The union remained the same
stance from the start to the end. From its statement, Korean Government Employees’
Union insisted that the reform will be the change for the worse and it will be the retro-
gressive revision in the future. The union even used the word, “Employee Bashing” in
its statement (Korean Government Employee’ Union 2015). But, the left-wing party and
the Federation of Government Employee Union, which is legally acknowledged as a
union, agreed on changing the civil servant pension. They claimed that the civil servant
pension should not be transferred into the public pension, and the pension only should
need the changes in the figures from the current bill. The differences in the policy deep
core, of course, developed into the difference in the secondary beliefs.
In the case of secondary belief, ‘structure reform coalition group’ insisted the “Complete
Structure Reform”. Inside the complete structure reform, the main purpose was that the civil
servant pension should eventually transfer into the public pension in order to reduce the
current debt in the government financial plan. Therefore, the 2015 reform should be the first
step for terminating the civil servant pension. On the other sides, ‘parametric reform coalition
group’ proclaimed the “Parametric Reform”. In the parametric reform proposal, the group
claimed that to reduce the deficit, the figures of contribution rate and entitlements should be
adjusted, not the whole civil servant system. Since the civil servant pension contributes to
the stability of the lives of civil servants, transferring the civil servant pension into the public
pension is the preposterous reform that does not consider the civil servant’s side.
Roles of policy entrepreneurs
Policy experts as both entrepreneurs and brokers
Conflicting strategies from a variety of coalitions are normally mediated by a third
group of actors, ACF used the term, ‘policy brokers’ or ‘policy entrepreneurs’ whose
principal care is to find some reasonable conditions that will reduce intense conflict
with a neutral position (Christopoulos & Ingold, 2015; Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier 1994;
Rich, 2005; Smith, 1993). In this case, there were two policy entrepreneurs: Kim Tae-il
(Professor of Public Administration at Korea University) and Kim Yong-Ha (Professor
of Finance and Insurance at Soonchunhyang University). Since the two coalition groups
could not get agreed on any of their proposals, the two policy brokers from third-party
stepped-in and made the compromises (Table 5).
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The main point of the Kim Tae-Il plan was to have a saving account as an arbitration
scheme. In the long run, the civil servant pension should be merged with the National
Pension System as the second pillar of the multi-pillar system. The figures he made
were much same with the government proposal, however, he insisted a deal in conjunc-
tion with the new individual retirement account to preserve the reduction amount in
contribution rate and entitlements. The government will compensate the amount of re-
duction. By doing it so, it will make easier to merge the civil servant pension into the
National Pension System in the future. However, the Opposition Party and the Civil
Servant’s Union did not agree to the proposal. They addressed that: 1. they worry about
the gradual decrease in government compensation for civil servants as time goes by. 2.
they worry about the role of National Pension in the future because the pension might
gradually decrease as well.
After the two coalition groups rejected several proposals such like government plan,
both party plans, and Professor Kim Tae-Il plan, the last proposal from Professor Kim
Yong-Ha had been started to take the center stage. The plan made by Kim Yong-ha,
who is a financial management Professor at Soonchunhyang University offers the same
payment and premium ratios of 1.65% and 10.0%, respectively, to both newly hired and
existing civil servant. It suggested raising the premium ratio by 3 percentage points
from 7.0% while lowering the current payment ratio of 1.9% by 0.25 percentage point.
Prof. Kim Yong-Ha had the highest amount of savings as high as 394.5 trillion won
until the year of 2085 (Kang, 2015) (Table 6).
Political consensus
After months of tough struggling, the major and opposition parties passed a bill on
May 2015 to modify the pension plan for civil servants. The parties had to extend the
extra congress session, originally decided to close on the day before, by one more day
as their negotiations dragged on. During the period, Cho Yun-Sun who is Senior Secretary
to the President for Political Affairs expressed her intention to resign because of delaying
the reform. At last, the main point of the bill went as civil servants to pay more now and
receive less in the future. Specifically, the modified plan compels them to contribute 9% of
their monthly income to their pension plan, raising the rate from the current 7% over the
next five years, while reducing their pension payment rate to 1.7% from 1.9% over the next
twenty years. With the passage of the pension reform bill, the government will be able to
secure about 333 trillion won over the next 70 years. It is true that the reformed bill did
not follow perfectly on the proposal that the policy brokers made. However, it is also true
that the policy brokers found some reasonable compromises that will lessen the intense
conflict between two coalition groups (Ministry of Security and Administration and civil
unions). From the reformed bill, one can see that in order to conduct and adjust the con-
flict between the advocacy coalition groups, the existence of policy broker can play a
major role to produce the successful policy outcome.
Conclusion and implications
Summary
This case study provides a theoretical framework about how policy knowledge and
entrepreneurs can contribute to building institutional reform as social innovation. We
examined how pension reform plans developed by policy entrepreneurs(experts or
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brokers) can induce a political consensus to the pension reform. Table 7 shows a pay-
off matrix between two different advocacy coalition groups toward the 2015 pension re-
form proposals. The coalition A group supported by the union groups and minority
political party(opposition party) disagrees with the reform because the reform cut the
pension benefits. In this sense, the reform generates a negative pay-off matrix(e.g. − 3)
for the coalition A group but nothing more payment (e.g., 0) without reform. On the
other hand, the coalition B group supports the reform to design a sustainable financial
pension scheme. However, a pay-off matrix may be not positive(e.g., 0) for the coalition
B group because the reform involves a huge political resistance and the payoff matrix is
even worse(e.g., − 3) without reform for this coalition B group.
Based on the nature of the pay-off matrix, the optimal strategy is Output3, where the
coalition A group disagree on the reform and the coalition B group agree on it. In other
words, Output3 means we cannot develop a political consensus for the pension reform.
The reform consensus is possible at only Output 4. However, the coalition A disagree
on Output 4 because this group does not want to reform. What factors can build the
reform consensus by relocating from Output 3 to Output 4. Policy knowledge generates
political pressure that pushes the coalition A group into agree the pension reform and
policy entrepreneurs also persuaded the coalition A group into accepting the reform
proposal. Policy entrepreneurs explored a common ground that both coalition groups
can agree on, where the pension reform proposal involved the parametric reform. The
pension reform process can be regarded as social innovation allowing political consen-
sus with competing political interests and providing a learning opportunity of social
learning that Korean society.
Policy implications and further research
The ACF model provides social implications about how to induce significant policy
reform through constructing common values and beliefs. More specifically, this case
suggests that policy knowledge and information about pension reform proposals
can play a key role in preventing stakeholder groups from leaving the line of the pen-
sion reform. A detailed roadmap for specific policy alternatives and pension reform
proposals was specifically reported in the media, creating an atmosphere for social
consensus (Radaelli, 1995). Specific information or policy knowledge on institutional
reforms from relevant stakeholders has put pressure on social consensus. In particular, if
information and knowledge on specific pension reform proposals were not provided to
the public through policy experts with diverse stances from online mass media, resistance
Table 7 Pay off matrix of building political consensus for the 2015 pension reform of Korean civil
servants
Advocacy Coalition A (Disagree on Reform:
Minority Party, Union)
No Yes
Advocacy Coalition B (Agree on Reform:
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from public employee unions’ pension reform would be strong. The presentation of alter-
natives to the pension reform proposals from the Korean Pension Association as well as
policy experts involved in the ruling party and the opposition party prompted national
consensus on the necessity and necessity of reforming the public employee pension sys-
tem. Specific and clear information may prevent seeking to blame games for competing
solutions to massive institutional reforms (Weaver, 2010).
Due to the increasing social pressure on civil unions, civil unions have accepted pen-
sion reforms. Social innovation is achieved through the pressure on stakeholders to
draw concessions and sacrifices. The appropriate level of civic responsibility and pres-
sure for stakeholders surrounding pension reform is an effective factor in eliminating
the obstacles to complex pension reforms. In addition, stakeholders involved in pension
reform learn from civic responsibilities to reduce social conflicts, providing fundamen-
tal assets of sustainable social innovation. In summary, policy knowledge about specific
concrete policy alternatives to pension reforms has put a great deal of social pressures
on the government to restrain the resistance of civil unions and to encourage social
consensus on reform proposals. In addition, the government and the ruling party had a
strong push for President Park’s will - public sector reform. In the Public Sector Reform
Program under the Park Administration of South Korea, reform of the public pension
system was set as the most important priority. These government-led strong reform ini-
tiatives played a fundamental role in the pension reform proposal. In addition, policy
entrepreneurs attempted to build a strong link between positive government interven-
tion and policy knowledge. These factors contributed to inducing a political consensus
to the pension reform proposal. Further, this policy experience and learning to achieve
political consensus to pension reform with competing interests in South Korea will pro-
vide social asset to facilitate future institutional reforms as social innovation.
The study still shows some limitations in using the ACF model to the 2015 South
Korea civil servant pension reform. First, as mentioned early that one of the ACF
model’s premise is based on the 10 years administration period. Unlike from the United
States or other countries that usually last decade for the presidential period, the admin-
istration in South Korea only activates 4 years. Second, as most of the references are
based on the news, statements, and speech, it was hard to know the changes in the atti-
tudes of each actor or the process of progress during the meeting thoroughly. Future
research is required to interview each actor and find out how and why they changed
their stances and positions. In addition, it is necessary to study social knowledge and
experience about how political consensus on various social conflicts and policy
agenda are formed and what civic learning and skills are useful for the reform process
(Stone, 2001, 2002). Finally, we need a better theory to explain how knowledge and
ideas can contribute to solving various political and social dilemmas embedded into
public and social agenda for community innovation(Bekkers et al., 2013; Béland, 2005).
Future research is required to examine various successful or unsuccessful policy reforms
derived from policy ideas and knowledge.
Endnotes
1The contribution and burden ratio of the public employee pension law is raised from
14% to 18%, the pension payment rate is reduced from 1.9% to 1.7%, and the survivor
pension benefit rate is 60% from 70% Respectively. The pension age will be adjusted
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gradually from the current age of 60 to 65 and the retirement pension and survivor
pension amount will be frozen regardless of the price level for five years from 2016.
The pension reform of Korean civil servants came into effect from January 1, 2016 and
would be expected to reduce approximately the amount of 1.5 trillion won in 2016 and
497 trillion won within 70 years in the future.
2Bernd Marin, director of the Austrian Institute for Social Welfare Policy, said it was
a tremendous success for Korea to make pension reforms in a relatively short period of
time, which is difficult to draw social consensus in the short term in Europe. In
addition, Hashimann, a director of pension bureau, who works for the Austrian prime
minister, said, “The 4% increase in contributions made by Korean officials and the
Korean government through the reform over the past four years is a courageous
choice in the world.” He also mentioned, “It is desirable to downgrade the annual
pension rate gradually from 1.9% to 1.7% over 20 years.” Junichiro Sakamoto at
Nomura Research Institute of Japan also ranked South Korea’s civil service pension
reform as a great success.
3For instance, Weiss & Bucuvalas (1977) argued that a concentration below 10 or less
years on policy decision-making eventually will underestimate the influence of policy
analysis because certain study or works are made primarily to modify the perceptual
systems of policy establishers over time. For example, the literature writings or great
works on policy tools also shows to the need for time frames of 10 years or more, to
finish at least one implementation or reformulation cycle and to gain and acquire a rea-
sonably accurate picture of success and failure. Many of studies have described that en-
terprising plans or schemes that appeared after several years to be mean failures gained
more favorable scores in assessments when considered in a longer time period, initial
successes may be vaporized over time vice versa (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1994).
4For example, inside the policy subsystems, there are interactions between actors
from various institutions and coalitions that try to seek, follow or influence the govern-
mental decisions in a political field. Scholz insisted that the concept and image of pol-
icy subsystems should be expended from traditional view of iron triangles limited to
single level of government such as political associations, legislative committees, or
interest groups to more profound levels such like actors from various government posi-
tions, as well as press, policy analysts or reporter who play important roles in the cre-
ation, dissemination, and criteria of policy plans (Scholz, 1991).
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